The political economy of discretionary central government grants for infrastructure: empirical evidence from Indonesia
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We investigate whether the allocation of discretionary grants for infrastructure from the central government to the districts are determined by district need, political alignment of the central government with local district heads, or past electoral support for the incumbent president. We find that transfers are in part determined by needs characteristics, but that political considerations matter significantly. We find no effect for political party alignment between the central and the district government, but the political support that the president received in the presidential elections does influence the allocation. Districts providing low support received significantly more than the core supporting districts, but only in the president’s first term. In the second term, after which reelection is impossible, political considerations were largely absent, and the explanatory power of the needs variables increased strongly, consistent with the view that discretionary grants are seen by the president as an instrument to increase his chance of reelection.
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