Does deterrence treatment have a dynamic impact on tax compliance? Evidence from experimental study in Indonesia

Crawford School of Public Policy | Arndt-Corden Department of Economics

Event details

PhD Seminar (Econ)

Date & time

Friday 18 October 2024
11.00am–12.15pm

Venue

Weston Theatre JG Crawford Building and Online Zoom

Speaker

Agung Satyadini

This paper analyses the dynamic effects of interventions on small businesses’ tax compliance in Indonesia. Specifically, it examines whether the deterrence intervention produce sustainable and long-lasting effects rather than just immediate outcomes compared to non-deterrence interventions. We estimate the long-term impact of these interventions and resend the initial treatment letters one year after our initial trials. Our findings show that deterrence letters lead to a significant increase in tax payment rates and have a more enduring impact on the likelihood of timely filing during the observation periods. Additionally, in our repeated experiments, we observe a significant reduction in the average treatment effects across all interventions; however, deterrence letters continue to substantially increase the likelihood of tax payment.

To join in-person:

Venue: Weston Theatre, JG Crawford Building, 132 Lennox Crossing, Acton 2601 ACT (ANU Crawford School of Public Policy)

To join online:

Please register to receive a Zoom link.

Updated:  16 October 2024/Responsible Officer:  Crawford Engagement/Page Contact:  CAP Web Team