The role of bribes in rural governance: The Case of India

Crawford School of Public Policy | Arndt-Corden Department of Economics

Event details

ACDE Seminar

Date & time

Tuesday 11 June 2013
2.00pm–3.30pm

Venue

Coombs Seminar Room B, Coombs Building, Fellows Road, ANU

Speaker

Raghbendra Jha, ANU

Contacts

Daniel Suryadarma
61250304

Given that the phenomenon of capture of public programs by sections the population is rampant in developing countries, households can indulge in a strategy to improve their participation by bribing the suppliers of such programs. This is an important issue affecting both the supply of local public goods and the incidence of corruption. To the best of our knowledge there is no analysis of the impact of bribery on participating in a local public goods program, anywhere. Using a unique data set for rural India this paper addresses the question of whether households bribe elected officials responsible for assuring such supply to improve their access to local public goods. We find considerable evidence of such bribing. We also model the welfare effects of such bribing on groups of households as well as the impact of bribery on aggregate welfare. Several policy conclusions are advanced.

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